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We examine how liquidity is exchanged in different types of Colombian money market 
networks (i.e. secured, unsecured, and central bank’s repo networks). Our examination first 
measures and analyzes the centralization of money market networks. Afterwards, based on 
a simple network optimization problem between financial institutions’ mutual distances and 
number of connections, we examine the tradeoff between liquidity risk and counterparty 
risk. Empirical evidence suggests that different types of money market networks diverge in 
their centralization, and in how they balance counterparty risk and liquidity risk. We 
confirm an inverse and significant relation between counterparty risk and liquidity risk, 
which differs across markets in an intuitive manner. We find evidence of liquidity cross-
underinsurance in secured and unsecured money markets, but they differ in their nature. 
Central bank’s role in mitigating liquidity risk is also supported by our results. 
Keywords: liquidity risk, counterparty risk, network, centralization, money market 
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During the global financial crisis of 2007-08 liquidity risk and counterparty risk increased 
rapidly as liquidity was rationed amid financial institutions’ weakening (see Acharya et al. 
(2012), Acharya and Merrouche (2013), Abbassi et al. (2015), and Temizsoy et al.(2015)). 
As financial institutions became reluctant to engage in credit exposures, they started 
exchanging liquidity with the central bank. As a result, central bank borrowing facilities 
became an essential source of liquidity for financial institutions (Gale & Yorulmazer, 
2013), which alleviated tensions in the money market, and avoided widespread contagion. 
Understanding the relationship between liquidity risk and counterparty risk, a long-lived 
issue in related literature, has gained importance since then. 
Under the well-grounded notion that financial markets are among many other complex 
adaptive systems that may be better understood by means of network analysis (see Holland 
(1998), Sornette (2003), Haldane (2009), and Farmer et al. (2012)), we examine the 
connective structure of different types of money market networks in the Colombian case. 
Our examination is aimed at how liquidity is exchanged in the three markets that constitute 
the Colombian money market, namely secured and unsecured between financial 
institutions, and secured between financial institutions and the central bank. Such 
examination provides new insights about the tradeoff between liquidity risk and 
counterparty risk in money markets, corresponding to the tradeoff between the risk of being 
unable to find counterparties willing to provide liquidity and the risk of being unable to 
collect liquidity refunds, respectively.  
Our examination is based on measuring the centralization (Freeman, 1979) of different 
types of money market networks, and on exploring how such centralization is related to the 
tradeoff between counterparty risk and liquidity risk. Regarding centralization, we illustrate 
how the two extreme cases of network centralization (i.e. star and complete networks) may 
be explanatory about the different connective structures money markets may exhibit, and 
about their main economic properties. 
Regarding counterparty risk, based on recent research on the effects of connectedness in 
financial networks (see Battiston et al. (2012a) and Roukny et al. (2013)), we suggest that 
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under plausible conditions (e.g. market illiquidity, heterogeneous allocation of robustness) 
a complete network may be considered an extreme case of credit risk exposure that 
financial institutions avoid by establishing a few dedicated lending relationships (see Cocco 
et al. (2009), Afonso et al. (2013), and Temizsoy et al. (2015)). As in Castiglionesi and 
Wagner (2013) and Castiglionesi and Eboli (2015), counterparty risk and systemic risk, in 
the form of the costs of non-refunded liquidity and indirect contagion, respectively, deter 
financial institutions from providing liquidity insurance to all other financial institutions, 
and creates incentives for a sparse money market network in the form of underinsurance. 
This supports well-documented stylized facts of financial networks, namely their sparse, 
inhomogeneous, and clustered architecture (see Boss et al. (2004), Soramäki et al. (2007), 
Battiston et al. (2012b), Craig and von Peter (2014), in ‘t Veld and van Lelyveld (2014), 
and León and Berndsen (2014)), though it contradicts the theoretical model of Allen and 
Gale (2000), which argues that complete networks diversify counterparty risk under strict 
and unrealistic assumptions (e.g. complete information, complete markets, perfect 
competition, and agents’ homogeneity and identical behavior).
4
 On the other hand, as it has 
been put forth in favor of central counterparties, in the case of a star network (i.e. extreme 
centralization) counterparty risk is minimized by avoiding excessive exposures among 
financial institutions –by concentrating counterparty risk in a dedicated financial market 
infrastructure. 
About liquidity risk, we suggest that a complete network is an extreme case of liquidity 
availability in which all financial institutions have a borrower and lender relationship with 
each other, therefore minimizing the risk of not finding a counterparty to exchange liquidity 
with. In this vein, a complete network maximizes bilateral liquidity insurance in the sense 
of Castiglionesi and Wagner (2013) by reducing the distance between financial institutions. 
However, by reducing the distance among financial institutions to a minimum, a complete 
network not only minimizes liquidity risk but also creates counterparty risk by getting all 
financial institutions closely interconnected. 
                                                          
4
 Battiston et al. (2012b) and Roukny et al. (2013) tested that risk diversification effects are non-monotonic 
with respect to connectivity, and that diversification is conditional on the agents’ heterogeneity, market 
liquidity, the size of exogenous shocks, and the cost of credit runs. For instance, based on several 
configurations, Roukny et al. (2013) tested that in most cases cascade effects under illiquid market conditions 
are non-monotonically increasing on the number of connections of the network. This contradicts the base case 
model of Allen and Gale (2000). 
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As the two extreme cases of network centralization correspond to two particular cases of 
network optimization in which financial institutions’ connections (i.e. network’s density) 
and mutual distances are simultaneously minimized (see Ferrer i Cancho and Solé (2003) 
and Newman (2010)), we explore how different connective structures yield dissimilar 
combinations of liquidity risk and counterparty risk. That is, in our case we suggest that 
there is a direct relation between network’s density and counterparty risk, and a direct 
relation between financial institutions’ average distances and liquidity risk. And we suggest 
that there is an inverse relation between network’s density and financial institutions’ 
average distance. This last relation was manifest in global financial crisis of 2007-08 (see 
Acharya et al. (2012) and Temizsoy et al. (2015)), when surplus banks rationed liquidity  
amid increased uncertainty about counterparty risk (i.e. reducing density), which resulted in 
the difficulty of needy banks to access liquidity (i.e. higher average distance), with the 
consequent intervention of central banks as lenders of last resort to restore access to 
liquidity (i.e. to reduce average distance). 
Our suggested framework is also related to a general case of empirically-consistent social 
and economic networks formation illustrated by Hojman and Szeidl (2008), in which the 
benefits of establishing connections exhibits decreasing returns, whereas those benefits 
decay with network distance. In our case connections’ decreasing returns are related to 
risks, costs, and frictions associated to establishing and maintaining connections (e.g. 
counterparty risk), whereas network distance is related to how easy it is to find a 
counterparty to exchange liquidity with. 
Our results suggest that different types of money market networks diverge in their 
centralization according to their main economic features. As expected, by construction, 
central bank’s repo network is a fully centralized star network. Interestingly, the secured 
liquidity market and the entire money market are more centralized than the unsecured 
market. About how each market balances counterparty risk and liquidity risk, evidence 
suggests both secured and unsecured money markets display features consistent with 
liquidity cross-underinsurance (see Castiglionesi and Wagner (2013)), but they differ in 
their nature. We also find an inverse and significant relation between counterparty risk and 
liquidity risk, which differs across markets in an intuitive manner. 
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To the best of our knowledge this approach to examining the connective structure of 
financial networks is missing. All in all, our work sheds light on how liquidity exchanges 
between financial institutions occurs in different types of networks, and on how the tradeoff 
between liquidity risk and counterparty risk is resolved. As most literature on the ability of 
different network structures to manage liquidity is of a theoretical nature (see Allen and 
Gale (2000), Castiglionesi and Wagner (2013) and Castiglionesi and Eboli (2015)), our 
work provides some empirical ground to the discussion.  
One direct implication of our results is that the connective structure of central bank’s repo 
network may be particularly helpful in alleviating tensions in the money market. Thus, we 
provide evidence favoring the unconventional monetary policy measures adopted by central 
banks during the global financial crisis. Our results suggest that pledging collateral may 
grant access to money markets to a wide spectrum of financial institutions that are unable to 
trade liquidity in unsecured markets, as also reported by Allen et al. (1989) for the United 
States, presumably due to collateral’s role in mitigating problems related to asymmetric 
information (see Berger et al. (2011)). However, evidence points out that pledging 
collateral may leave the underinsurance problem unsolved. Finally, our work is relevant to 
related financial literature because it adds to existing traditional statistics in order to better 
analyze financial markets. All these are contributions that are important for better 
understanding financial markets, and as additional tools for policy making. 
 
2 Centralization of networks and the money market 
Most research related to centrality in financial networks is devoted to measuring the 
importance of financial institutions, especially with systemic importance in view (see León 
et al. (2015)). Nevertheless, financial networks’ centralization, corresponding to how 
centralized financial networks are, is an issue to be addressed by related literature. In this 
section we first introduce the network’s centralization concept and its relation to the well-
known centrality concept. Afterwards we substantiate the importance of financial network’s 
centralization for examining and understanding the main structural properties of the money 
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market and its constituent networks, namely the secured, unsecured and central bank’s repo 
networks.  
2.1 Centralization of networks 
Centrality is a common concept in network analysis. It is a quantification of how important 
a participant or vertex is in a networked system, with many possible definitions of 
importance, and correspondingly many centrality measures (Newman, 2010). Some 
centrality measures are rather straightforward. For instance, the simplest centrality measure, 
degree centrality, corresponds to the number of connections or edges of a vertex. Some 
other measures of centrality are increasingly convoluted and aimed at specific purposes or 
systems, such as betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1977), closeness centrality (see 
Newman, 2010), eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972), Katz centrality (see Newman, 
2010), PageRank (Brin & Page, 1998), and hub and authority centrality (Kleinberg, 1998). 
Although centrality is commonly circumscribed to the importance of vertexes within a 
network, there are also centrality measures as a property of the whole network. 
Correspondingly, Freeman (1977 & 1979) refers to point centrality when quantifying the 
importance of vertexes in a networked system, and to structural or graph centrality when 
quantifying how centralized a network is. In the latter case, Freeman suggests that the 
structural centrality corresponds to measuring the tendency of a single vertex to be more 
central than all the others (i.e. the dominance of one vertex within the network), in the form 
of a network’s centralization index. Accordingly, henceforth we will use centrality when 
referring to point centrality, and we will use centralization and structural centrality 
interchangeably. 
Ideally, all indexes of network centralization, regardless of the underlying centrality 
measure, should comply with two features (Freeman, 1979): (i) They should index the 
extent to which the centrality of the most central vertex exceeds the centrality of all other 
vertexes, and (ii) they should be expressed as a ratio of that excess to its maximum possible 
value for a graph containing the same number of vertexes. In this vein, let   be a centrality 
measure (e.g. degree, closeness);   the number of vertexes;   (  ) the  -centrality of the  -
vertex;   ( ̅) the largest value of   (  ) for any vertex in the network; and  ̌   the 
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maximum possible sum of differences in the chosen  -centrality measure for a network of 
  vertexes, an acceptable network centralization index (  ) should be in the following 
form: 
   
∑ [  ( ̅)    (  )]
 
   
 ̌  
 
where 
       
[1] 
 
The numerator of    will determine to what extent the centrality of the most central vertex 
(  ( ̅)) exceeds the centrality of all other vertexes. The denominator ( ̌  ) will express the 
numerator as a ratio to the maximum possible value of    for a graph containing the same 
number of vertexes, thus it is bounded to the lower and upper limits 0 and 1, respectively.  
Different centrality measures may yield different network centralization indexes. Though, 
two extreme cases of network centralization have been identified and studied in the 
literature, namely the star (or wheel) network and the complete network (see Freeman 
(1977 & 1979), de Nooy et al. (2005), and Everett & Borgatti (2007)). Figure 1 presents 
these two cases for a nine vertex non-weighted and non-directed graph. 
 





Figure 1. Networks’ centralization limit cases for a nine vertex non-weighted and non-
directed graph. The star network (left panel) displays the maximum centralization because 




Irrespective of the centrality measure, the highest centralization corresponds to the star 
network (Figure 1, left panel), in which a single vertex (v1) is connected to all other 
vertexes, which are not connected to each other. Regarding its connective pattern, the ratio 
of observed edges to possible edges, commonly known as density ( ), is minimal for a star 
network.
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 Furthermore, as its density tends to zero as the number of participants increases, 
a star network is said to be sparse (see Newman (2010)). Also, by construction, the star 
network has an inhomogeneous distribution of edges, in which all non-dominant vertexes 
have a single edge, and the sole dominant vertex has     edges. About the shortest number 
of edges between participants, commonly known as the average path length or average 
distance ( ), it tends to 2 as the number of participants in a star network increases.6  
On the other hand, the minimal centralization corresponds to the complete network (Figure 
1, right panel), in which all vertexes are connected among them.
7
 As all possible edges are 
present, complete network’s average distance between vertexes is the minimum attainable 
(      ), whereas its density is the highest attainable (      ). The distribution of 
edges in a complete network is homogeneous: all vertexes have the same number of edges 
(   ) and all vertexes are evenly close to each other. 
Structural centrality is relevant to the way groups get organized to solve at least some kinds 
of problems (Freeman, 1979). In some cases, networks are designed specifically to achieve 
a particular goal, and the structure of the network can heavily influence the efficiency with 
which that goal is accomplished (Newman, 2010). In this sense, the structure of a network 
and its centralization may result from an optimization process, by which a tradeoff between 
conflicting objectives is resolved.  
                                                          
5
 Density ( ) measures the cohesion of the network. The density of a graph with no self-edges is the ratio of 
actual edges ( ) to the maximum number of edges:    ( (   ))⁄ . In the case of star networks     
as    ; for each additional vertex there is only one additional edge, but     additional possible edges. 
6
 As in Newman (2010), let     be the shortest path (in number of edges) between vertexes   and  , the 
average path length ( ), also known as the mean geodesic distance, corresponds to the mean of    over all  -
reachable vertexes,    
 
(   )
∑     (  ) . In the case of star networks     as     because only distances 
related to the dominant vertex are different from 2. 
7
 An alternative to the complete network as an extreme case of minimal centralization is the circle network 
(see Freeman (1979)). A circle graph may be constructed by removing non-exterior edges in Figure 1 (i.e. by 
preserving edges v1-v2, v2-v3, … v9-v1). As the density of the star and complete graphs correspond to the two 
extreme cases of connected networks examined by Freeman, we work with star and complete networks only. 
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A general case for such network optimization process is presented by Ferrer i Cancho and 
Solé (2003). This optimization minimizes network’s density ( ) and the average distance 
between vertexes ( ), which are conflicting objectives by construction. In several types of 
networks (e.g. transport, distribution, communication) it is natural to minimize the costs 
related to establishing connections by means of minimizing their number (i.e. networks’ 
density), whereas it is also usual to minimize the distance, time or intermediaries necessary 
to fulfill the goal of the network.  
The tradeoff between these two conflicting objectives often determines network’s 
connective structure and –thus- its centralization. As reported by Ferrer i Cancho and Solé 
(2003), four non-trivial types of networks are obtained by making linear combinations of   
and   in an optimization model: sparse homogeneous networks with evenly distributed 
edges (i.e. Poisson networks), sparse inhomogeneous networks (i.e. scale-free networks), 
star networks, and highly dense networks. As it is usual with complex systems, this 
network optimization is particularly non-linear, with sharp discontinuities (i.e. phase 
transitions) resulting from continuous changes in the linear combination of   and  . 
Regarding the feasibility of the two extreme cases of centralization, it is rather uncommon 
to find star or complete real networks. As in Barabasi (2003), real networks are not 
centralized as a star: there are hierarchies of hubs that keep networks together, a heavily 
connected vertex closely followed by several less connected ones, trailed by dozens of even 
less connected. On the other hand, complete networks correspond to systems in which 
every element is connected to each other in a feedback loop, and –thus- they are hopelessly 
unstable (see Simon (1962) and Anderson (1999)). As put forward by Miller and Page 
(2007), the adaptive actions of individual agents lead the system away from the critical 
regimes (i.e. star and complete networks) and more toward what an omniscient designer 
attempting to balance risk and stability would create. 
2.2 Money market network’s centralization 
Bilateral liquidity transactions between financial institutions in the money market face 
tradeoffs that may be depicted by an optimization process similar to the one described 
before. A complete credit network, in which all financial institutions have a borrower and 
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lender relationship with each other, would maximize the availability of counterparties for 
exchanging liquidity. As in Castiglionesi and Eboli (2015), absent any cost related to 
exchanging liquidity among financial institutions, a complete (i.e. decentralized) network is 
the most efficient network. Thus, minimizing the obstacles to building a decentralized 
money market network would tend to generate benefits in the form of maximizing bilateral 
liquidity insurance in the sense of Castiglionesi and Wagner (2013). 
However, the distribution of liquidity imposes costs to financial institutions, such as 
transaction, monitoring, informational, and risk-related costs. These costs turn a complete 
network into an inefficient one (see Castiglionesi and Eboli (2015)), and may impede a 
complete money market network from arising. First, repeated interactions with a few 
counterparties may reduce the costs of information asymmetry (see Afonso et al. (2013)). 
Second, as the extension of credit is conditional on the assessment of credit worthiness and 
the establishment of a relationship between a borrower and lender, financial institutions are 
willing to get into a credit contract only with a few counterparties (Battiston et al., 2012a). 
That is, counterparty risk and systemic risk, in the form of the costs of non-refunded 
liquidity and indirect contagion, respectively, deter financial institutions from providing 
liquidity insurance to all other financial institutions, and creates incentives for a sparse 
money market network in the form of underinsurance (see Castiglionesi and Wagner (2013) 
and Castiglionesi and Eboli (2015)). Financial institutions’ reluctance to engage in credit 
exposures immediately after the Lehman Brothers failure (and other crisis events) is a fair 
example of the inverse relation between counterparty risk and network connectedness. 
Other factors –besides transaction and monitoring costs- may turn a complete network into 
an unlikely connective structure for money markets as well. For instance, as in Allen and 
Gale (2010), Afonso et al. (2013), and Craig and von Peter (2014), heterogeneity among 
financial institutions (e.g. different balance sheets, sizes, risk profiles, business lines, 
specializations, funding needs, cash flows, capital market access, location, conglomerates) 
may impede complete money market networks from arising. Furthermore, following 
Assenza et al. (2011) and León and Berndsen (2014), it is likely that financial institutions 
avoid maximizing linkages due to finite resources (e.g. finite funds, counterparty risk 
limits), which forces weakening prior interactions in favor of new or better ones. 
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Conversely, a fully centralized star-shaped network would minimize transaction, 
monitoring and liquidity costs for the money market as a whole. Minimally connected 
networks with a star shape are known to be the most efficient structure given a fixed 
number of links (de Nooy et al., 2005), thus maximizing aggregate welfare because they 
support trading at the lowest linking cost (Babus, 2012). Correspondingly, as in 
Castiglionesi and Eboli (2015), the star network achieves the full coverage of liquidity risk 
for the system with the minimum expected losses (i.e. there are no excessive exposures), 
hence it is the less inefficient in guaranteeing the coverage of liquidity risk.
8
 However, as 
being at the center conveys advantages (e.g. collecting intermediation fees, market power, 
and systemic importance subsidies) and disadvantages (e.g. informational costs), 
competition for the dominant position may arise. A few financial institutions sharing the 
advantages and disadvantages of being central could grow a core-periphery network 
structure. 
Such an optimization process, in which there is a minimization of two conflicting 
objectives, namely liquidity risk and counterparty risk, corresponds to the tradeoff between 
the risk of being unable to find counterparties willing to provide liquidity and the risk of 
being unable able to collect liquidity refunds, respectively. This tradeoff, alongside other 
factors, may explain why the money market network depicts an incomplete market in the 
sense of Allen and Gale (2000). The result is the incomplete and clustered nature of credit 
networks (see Battiston et al. (2012b)), prompted by the prevalence of dedicated 
counterparties in the form of a few repeated interactions between financial institutions (see 
Cocco et al. (2009), Babus (2012), Afonso et al. (2013), Craig and von Peter (2014), and 
Temizsoy et al. (2015)).  
A precise optimal structure, in the form of a network somewhere between full and null 
centralization, is elusive. A myriad of possible structures, with very different architectures 
and centralization levels, is feasible. However, there is already some convergence in recent 
literature about the sparse and inhomogeneous architecture of observed financial networks, 
either in the form of a core-periphery (see Craig and von Peter (2014) and in ‘t Veld and 
                                                          
8
 This is precisely the main argument in favor of using central counterparties in over the counter markets: 
reducing counterparty risk and other costs (e.g. monitoring) by the interposition of a single participant that 
settles and clears bilateral exposures between financial institutions. 
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van Lelyveld (2014)), a scale-free (see Boss et al. (2004) and Soramäki et al. (2007)), or a 
modular scale-free network (see León and Berndsen (2014)). The well-documented 
sparseness suggests that financial networks are not complete networks. Also, because there 
are a few well-connected financial institutions –instead of a single one-, it reasonable to 
discard star-shaped networks too. Therefore, financial networks’ structural stylized facts 
suggest that they conform to most real networks, with star or complete networks as unlikely 
outcomes.  
 
3 The dataset 
In spite literature tends to generalize about how bilateral liquidity transactions between 
financial institutions occur, it is clear that all money market transactions are not the same. 
Some correspond to secured transactions, in which the lender provides liquidity to the 
borrower with the refund of the loan being secured by the existence of collateral. Some 
correspond to unsecured transactions, referred in the Colombian market as interbank funds 
borrowing, in which the lender provides liquidity to the borrower without any collateral 
securing the refund of the loan. Secured and unsecured liquidity transactions between 
financial institutions are the focus of most literature on financial networks.  
However, central banks participate in money markets as well. A realistic model of money 
markets has to take the central bank into account (Georg & Poschmann, 2010). Central 
banks may be regarded as the most important participants of money markets as their 
intervention determines the efficient allocation of money among financial institutions (see 
Allen et al. (2009), Freixas et al. (2011), and Acharya et al. (2012)). Under monetary policy 
considerations, central banks lend (borrow) to (from) financial institutions in the form of –
secured- open market operations. An interesting feature regarding central bank’s liquidity 
transactions is that they constitute a star-shaped network by construction: The central bank 
will be the dominant vertex (v1 in the left panel of Figure 1), whereas all other financial 
institutions will connect to each other through the central bank. 
In the Colombian case the secured market between financial institutions comprise repos and 
sell-buy backs (i.e. similar to repos) on sovereign fixed income securities, corporate fixed 
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income securities, and equity. As of 2014 those secured liquidity transactions’ value 
contributes with about 52.51%, with 98.10% (51.52%) corresponding to sell-buy backs on 
sovereign fixed income securities (Banco de la República, 2015). Open market operations 
between financial institutions and the central bank are the second most important source of 
liquidity in the Colombian money market, contributing with about 43.38% of its value. 
Consistent with the recent monetary policy stance, all open market operations during 2014 
were expansionary repos, consisting of the central bank providing liquidity to financial 
institutions against collateral. Unsecured liquidity transactions are the third source of 
liquidity with a contribution about 4.11%. The aggregation of these three types constitutes 
the Colombian money market, as displayed in Table 1.  
 
Type Transaction Contribution 
Secured 
Sell-buy backs on sovereign securities 51.52% 
Other sell-buy backs 0.70% 
Repos  0.29% 
Open market operations (central bank’s repos) 43.38% 
Unsecured Interbank funds 4.11% 
Table 1. Money market transactions. Sell-buy backs on sovereign securities and 
open market operations with the central bank are the most contributive sources 
of liquidity for financial institutions in the Colombian case. Interbank funds is a 
subsidiary source of liquidity. Based on Banco de la República (2015). 
 
Due to the contribution of each type of liquidity transaction in the Colombian case, our 
dataset will discard those corresponding to repos and sell-buy backs on corporate fixed 
income securities and equity, which together represent about 1.00%. Therefore, our dataset 
focuses on three liquidity transactions: sell-buy backs on sovereign fixed income securities, 
open market operations, and interbank funds, which contribute with 51.52%, 43.38%, and 
4.11% of money market liquidity’s value, respectively.  
Our dataset consist of consolidated bilateral transactions that occurred between May 2 2013 
and October 30 2015 (i.e. 609 days of data). Our dataset comprises the three different types 
of liquidity transactions that are typical of money markets: secured (72,980 transactions) 
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and unsecured between financial institutions (16,329 transactions), and secured between 
financial institutions and the central bank (10,051 transactions). Consolidated transactions 
in all three markets sum up to 96,874. 
As depicted by Martínez and León (2015), the Colombian money market has some unusual 
features worth highlighting. The contribution of unsecured lending is rather low despite it is 
open to all types of financial institutions (i.e. banking and non-banking, local and foreign, 
private and government-owned). Only a fraction of all financial institutions lend and 
borrow without collateral, and they are all banking institutions. In this sense, following 
Castiglionesi and Wagner (2013), the Colombian unsecured money market appears to 
display liquidity cross-underinsurance, in which the existence of potential negative 




Consequently, most financial institutions, typically small non-banking institutions, lend and 
borrow against collateral only, as confirmed by the substantial contribution of sell-buy 
backs on sovereign securities. Based on anecdotal evidence in the Colombian case, this has 
been related to local financial institutions’ aversion to counterparty risk (Martínez & León, 
2015). Furthermore, central bank’s open market operations sizeable importance reinforces 
the argument of liquidity cross-underinsurance in the Colombian case. As also reported by 
Allen et al. (1989) for the United States, collateral is very important in determining 
effective access to money markets in the Colombian case.  
About the construction of money market networks, we work with adjacency matrices, 
which are the most common mathematical representation of a network. As reciprocity is by 
no means warranted between financial institutions, the direction of edges (i.e. from lender 
to borrower) is relevant, thus we work with directed adjacency matrices.
10
 For a system of 
                                                          
9
 It has been tested that Colombian banking institutions with higher probabilities of becoming insolvent pay 
significantly more for unsecured funding (see Sarmiento et al. (2015)), which highlights the importance of 
market discipline (see Furfine (2001)). 
10
 For constructing central bank’s repo network we assume that an edge from the central bank to a financial 
institution always implies the existence of an edge from the financial institution to the central bank; that is, we 
assume reciprocity. By making such assumption we are able to incorporate the role of the central bank in 
expansionary and contractionary monetary stances, in which it is most plausible that those entitled to access 
liquidity from the central bank upon pledging collateral are also entitled to lend to it. This assumption not 
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  participants or vertexes, a directed adjacency matrix   is a square matrix of dimensions 
   , potentially non-symmetrical, with elements     such that  
                 {
                                  
                                                
} [2] 
In our case we do not assign real numbers to the edges; that is, we do not work on weighted 
adjacency matrices. As we are interested in the connective structure of the network, with all 
our measures based on the number of edges (i.e. degree centrality and density) or path 
lengths (i.e. closeness centrality and average distance), working on non-weighted adjacency 
matrixes is appropriate. The dimensions of each matrix correspond to the number of 
participants for each market for each date in the sample; that is,   varies throughout the 




4 Main results 
We present our results in two subsections. First, we examine the main properties of the four 
markets, with emphasis on their centralization. Second, based on each network’s density 
and average distance, we interpret and analyze how each one of the markets solved the 
tradeoff between liquidity risk and counterparty risk.  
4.1 Main properties of the networks 
Some basic network statistics are useful for characterizing each market for the purposes of 
this paper.
12
 The most common have to do with the number of participants in each network, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
only allows circumventing the lack of contractionary transactions in the examined period, but it also preserves 
the analytical soundness and reach of our research. 
11
 An alternative is to keep the number of participants constant throughout the sample for each market. We 
tested this alternative and found that it is inconvenient as the density of the matrices is extremely biased to 
low values because all financial institutions would be expected to participate in the market at all times. 
Moreover, by using this alternative we would ignore that financial institutions may opt not to participate in 
the money market.  
12
 It is important to highlight that the non-large and disparate number of participants across the networks may 
complicate their examination by means of the selected basic network statistics: some of them are intended for 
large networks. For instance, we attempted to estimate the power-law coefficients based on Clauset et al. 
(2009), but in some cases the number of participants did not allow to do so in a sound manner –thus we 
decided not to report them. Also, it is important to acknowledge that there are numerous basic statistics useful 
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its density, the average distance between participants, and network’s centralization. We also 
calculate the assortativity coefficient (see Newman (2010)), which measures how correlated 
participants are based on their degree (i.e. number of edges).
13
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Table 2. Mean and standard deviation (in brackets) of selected network statistics. All statistics are 
calculated on the number participating institutions for each market for each date in the sample (i.e. 
matrix dimensions varies throughout the sample). Figure 3 (see Appendix) displays time-series 
plots of selected network statistics. 
 
The average number of participants in each market and its corresponding network shows 
that central bank’s open market operations and the unsecured market are those with less 
financial institutions, about 17. The secured market, consisting of sell-buy backs between 
financial institutions with local sovereign securities as collateral, has about 42 participants, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
for characterizing financial networks, such as clustering coefficient and diameter –among others; for the 
purposes of this paper they are not considered as particularly illustrative. 
13
 As usual with correlation measures, the assortativity coefficient (Newman 2010) is bounded to the [-1,+1] 
interval. A positive correlation corresponds to those cases in which high-degree (low-degree) vertexes tend to 
be connected to other high-degree (low-degree) vertexes, whereas a negative correlation corresponds to those 
in which high-degree vertexes tend to be connected to low-degree vertexes. Positive correlation is typical of 
core-periphery structures, which is a common feature of social networks, whereas negative correlation is 
typical of star-like networks (see Newman (2010)).  
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whereas the entire money market has about 52. The average number of participants reveals 
that the unsecured market is limited to a small group of financial institutions 
notwithstanding it is open to all of them, whereas the secured displays more than twice the 
number of participants. It is reasonable that counterparty risk deters most lenders from 
providing liquidity without collateral (see Martinez and León (2015)), whereas such 
discriminatory access to unsecured liquidity may be considered a form of underinsurance.  
Consistent with literature on financial networks, all four networks are sparse. Sparseness is 
more acute in the entire money market network, in which only about 6% of potential edges 
are observed (        ); put another way, the typical financial institution exchanges 
liquidity with no more than 3 counterparties from 51 typically available. Similarly, the 
secured market network displays a low density (       ), whereas the unsecured and 
central bank’s repo networks have densities about 10% and 13%, respectively. The high 
degree of sparseness in the four networks confirms that they all considerably diverge from 
the complete network case. 
Under our analytical framework network’s sparseness may be interpreted as a signal of 
financial institutions minimizing expected losses and costs from credit exposures. As   
decreases (increases) financial institutions reveal that they are more (less) cautious about 
counterparty risk exposure. Therefore, observed sparseness suggests that counterparty risk 
aversion is important in the four networks. 
Central bank’s repo network displaying higher levels of density is somewhat unexpected. 
One of the main features of a star network is its ability to connect participants with the 
minimum density. However, as exhibited in Figure 3a and Figure 3b (see Appendix), the 
number of participants in central bank’s repo network varies throughout the sample and –
thus- causes its density to be unusually high when the number of participants drops 
considerably. Nonetheless, it is important to realize that central banks exchange liquidity 
pursuant a monetary policy and/or financial stability goal, with counterparty risk arising 
from lending being a secondary consideration. 
It is also rather unexpected to find that unsecured market’s density is higher than secured 
market’s. At first it could be interpreted as counterparty risk aversion being higher when 
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pledging collateral –a counterintuitive finding. Nevertheless, following Martínez and León 
(2015), it is reasonable to affirm that such contradictory finding arises from the fact that 
financial institutions regularly exchanging funds in the Colombian unsecured market are 
banking institutions that may enjoy exclusive access to central bank’s last-resort lending 
and other too-big-to-fail implicit guarantees. Put another way, the interbank funds market 
appears to be a smaller (     ) and denser (       ) club in which banking institutions 
may bilaterally exchange liquidity without pledging collateral, whereas the secured market 
is a larger (     ) and sparser (       ) group in which all types of financial institutions 
(i.e. banking and non-banking, small and large) and their dissimilar counterparty risks and 
features coexist. Such collateral-related discriminatory access to certain money markets is 
also observed in the United States (see Allen et al. (1989)). Interestingly, concurrent with 
King (2008), Gorton and Metrick (2012), and Martínez and León (2015), the absolute and 




Average distance ( ) measures how close financial institutions are among them. It reflects 
the global structure of the network, it depends on the way the entire network is connected, 
and cannot be inferred from any local measurement (Strogatz, 2003). Under our analytical 
framework the average distance is a measure of how easy it is for a financial institution to 
find a counterparty to exchange liquidity with based on repeated interactions. For instance, 
in the complete network case, in which        (i.e. all participants are one edge away 
from each other), all financial institutions have     potential counterparties readily 
available to exchange liquidity; in this sense, the complete network case is the case of full 
liquidity cross-insurance. As the level of   increases financial institutions find a lower 
number of readily available counterparts to exchange liquidity with. In our case, as in 
Hojman and Szeidl (2008), direct and indirect access between participants generates 
benefits, with those benefits decreasing with the distance between participants. 
Consequently, the average distance is a measure of liquidity risk in the corresponding 
                                                          
14
 If collaterals are not ideal (i.e. information-insensitive) in the sense of Gorton and Metrick (2010), concerns 
about the ability to recover the collateral value arise, and –thus- secured borrowing may not offset 
counterparty risk in full. 
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market, namely the risk of not finding a counterparty that is willing to borrow or lend funds 
based on prior exchange relations. 
The lowest average distance corresponds to the unsecured market (       ), meaning that 
the typical financial institution is about one edge away from all other financial institutions; 
that is, most financial institutions in the interbank funds market are connected to most 
available counterparties. Unusually low distance between financial institutions may be 
interpreted as evidence against liquidity underinsurance in the unsecured market. However, 
it is important to realize that discriminatory access to the unsecured market is also a form of 
underinsurance: non-banking financial institutions, typically smaller and without access to 
last-resort lending, are precluded from accessing liquidity in the absence of collateral. Such 
preclusion is not captured by the average distance statistic, but it is critical to understanding 
liquidity risk across money markets.
15
 
Secured networks display higher average distances (       ), which corresponds to 
average financial institutions being more than two edges away from all others; hence, most 
financial institutions require one or two intermediaries to connect to all available 
counterparties. This is counterintuitive when compared to unsecured market’s –lower- 
average distances. It means that pledging collateral results in average participant’s lower 
availability to find counterparties to exchange liquidity with. Again, the discriminatory 
access to the different money markets explains such striking finding: As the interbank 
funds market is a smaller and denser club in which banking institutions may bilaterally 
exchange liquidity without pledging collateral, the average distance between them is lower 
than that of the secured market –a larger and sparser group of dissimilar financial 
institutions. In this sense, pledging collateral allows a greater diversity of financial 
institutions accessing liquidity, which may be related to collateral’s role in mitigating the 
problems related to asymmetric information (see Berger et al. (2011)). 
                                                          
15
 Moreover, as the customary calculation of distance disregards non-reachable participants, absolute values 
of average distance may be biased downwards. This also explains why a rather sparse network such as the 
unsecured market (       ) attains averages distances close to unity. However, this type of inference is 
common in network analysis, and relative cross-section inferences are still valid. A plausible but unusual 
alternative is to impose arbitrary distances among non-reachable participants (e.g. infinite,    ) and to 
calculate appropriately. As expected, imposing     distances between non-reachable vertexes increased 
average distances manifestly for all networks but the one corresponding to central bank’s repos. Despite these 
alternative average distances do not conform to typical distances (e.g.     ) for networks of similar size, 
most cross-section inferences between non-central bank networks hold (see Figure 4 in Appendix). 
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Central bank’s repo network exhibits a distance corresponding to its star shape (        ), 
which results from financial institutions being two edges away by the interposition of the 
central bank. Nevertheless, by construction, as the central bank is the sole counterparty able 
to lend or borrow liquidity in this network, the actual average distance should be  ̂   
    , which corresponds to the fact that all participating financial institutions are one edge 
away from accessing central bank’s money. However, in order to maintain the consistency 
in the usage of network statistics, we treat central bank’s repo network as usual. 
The entire money market network displays an average distance similar to that of the 
secured market (        ). As in the case of the secured market, this may be interpreted 
as the bulk of financial institutions requiring one or two intermediaries to connect to all 
others, which may in turn reveal that most financial institutions are connected by the 
interposition of well-connected participants in a sparse network, presumably in a core-
periphery structure. 
Regarding networks’ centralization, we use the two simplest measures of centrality: degree 
and closeness. As before, degree centrality corresponds to the number of edges as a 
measure of network importance, whereas closeness centrality corresponds to the inverse of 
distance as a measure of network importance. As in Freeman (1979), degree centrality is an 
index of vertexes’ potential communication activity, whereas closeness centrality is an 
index of vertexes’ time and cost efficiency in the network. 
As previously stated, irrespective of the selected centrality measure, the star is by definition 
the most centralized network structure, in which a single dominant vertex is connected to 
all other vertexes, which are not connected to each other. In this sense, as depicted in Table 
2, and Figure 3d and Figure 3e (see Appendix), central bank’s repo network is the most 
centralized one, with degree centralization and closeness centralization being at their 
maximum values (i.e.               ). As a star network, central bank’s repo 
network achieves the full coverage of liquidity risk with the minimum expected losses; that 
is, with the minimal density, all financial institutions have a counterparty to exchange 
liquidity. It is uncommon to find real networks that conform to the extreme case of 
centralization in the form of a star network structure (see Barabasi (2003)). In this sense, 
despite central bank’s repo network is a real network, it is evident that its connective 
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structure is an artifice of financial regulation and policymaking, as it is also the case of 
central counterparties. Regarding monetary policy, if the central bank’s network is the only 
source of liquidity, the central bank would be able to set the money market interest rate in a 
direct manner, and monetary policy would be most efficient in terms of attaining a target 
cost for liquidity. The side effect of such a case would be that gains from market discipline 
would vanish: there will be no incentives for money market participants to monitor their 
counterparties. 
The other three networks differ from full centralization. The secured market attains degree 
centralization about 18% of that one of a star network with the same number of participants 
(        ), whereas the unsecured and the entire money market share the same level of 
degree centralization (             ). About closeness centralization, central bank’s 
repos networks display the highest centralization (         ), followed by the secured 
market (        ), the entire money market (         ), and the unsecured market 
(        ).  
Both centralization measures suggest that secured, unsecured, and the entire money market 
networks deviate significantly from the case of full centralization. This also suggests that 
there is no single participant that concentrates degree and closeness centrality in these three 
markets, whereas their sparseness suggests that they also deviate from a complete network. 
It is reasonable to affirm that these three networks have a structure that is between the star 
and complete networks, with the unsecured standing closer to a complete network. 
Interestingly, yet again we find a result that contradicts intuition: the secured market is 
more centralized than the unsecured market. Literature suggests that trading against 
collateral should result in direct trading among all financial institutions, resembling an 
anonymous trading exchange (see Babus (2012) and Afonso et al. (2013)), thus with a 
rather decentralized network structure. Nonetheless, our results suggest otherwise, and tend 
to favor the empirical findings of King (2008), Gorton and Metrick (2012), and Martínez 
and León (2015) about the limits of collateralization for mitigating counterparty risk. Once 
more, it is reasonable to affirm that such contradiction arises from the unsecured market 
being a smaller and denser club in which –larger- banking institutions alone may bilaterally 
exchange liquidity among them without collateral, whereas the secured market is larger and 
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sparser, with a dissimilar mix of financial institutions (i.e. banking and non-banking, large 
and small) that may intensify centralization around a small core of financial institutions. 
Regarding the assortativity coefficient (see Newman (2010)), which measures how 
participants tend to associate with others based on the similarity of their degree, we find 
that the central bank’s repo network is the only case that displays a negative coefficient 
(         ). A negative coefficient, resulting in disassortative mixing by degree, occurs 
when participants tend to associate with others who have a different degree (i.e. high-
degree vertexes tend to connect to low degree ones, and vice versa), and is typical of star-
like networks –such as that of central bank’s repo network.  
On the other hand, all other networks exhibit positive assortativity coefficients (i.e. 
assortative mixing by degree, or homophily), which means that high-degree vertexes tend to 
stick together in a dense core surrounded by a less dense periphery of low-degree vertexes, 
as in a core-periphery connective structure (Newman, 2010). This is consistent with the 
average distances of these three networks (       ,        ,         ), which reveal the 
role of some financial institutions as intermediaries in the core of a core-periphery 
structure. The unsecured market attains the highest coefficient (       ). This is expected 
as the unsecured market portraits a small club of financial institutions that are quite similar 
to each other (i.e. banking institutions), presumably in a core-periphery structure, as 
suggested in León et al. (2015). The secured and the entire money market attain positive 
assortative coefficients as well (       ,         ), but they are lower than that of the 
unsecured market. This means that they also depict a core-periphery connective structure, 
but it is less marked than that of the unsecured market. 
4.2 The tradeoff between liquidity risk and counterparty risk 
A simple optimization process that minimizes average distance and density attains the main 
types of networks, namely sparse homogeneous, scale-free (i.e. sparse inhomogeneous), 
star, and highly dense networks, as illustrated by Ferrer i Cancho and Solé (2003). In our 
case, we suggest that the overall structure of money market networks may result from an 
optimization process by which a tradeoff between minimizing liquidity risk (i.e. average 
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distance) and counterparty risk (i.e. density) is resolved. Therefore, it is interesting to 
examine how each network under analysis solves this tradeoff. 
Figure 2 presents a scatter plot that exhibits the different combinations of liquidity risk (y-
axis) and counterparty risk (x-axis) for each network, for each day in the sample; below the 
x-axis and to the left of y-axis there is a histogram that compares the distribution of 
observations for each market.  
 
 
Figure 2. Counterparty risk (x-axis) and liquidity risk (y-axis) tradeoff. Each 
marker corresponds to the combination between density and average distance 
calculated on observed daily networks for the four markets. 
 
It is rather clear that each one of the individual markets has a particular combination of 
liquidity and counterparty risks. For instance, consistent with Table 2, comparing secured 
(orange circles) and unsecured (yellow squares) reveals that unsecured market’s tradeoff 
involves lower liquidity risk (i.e. lower average distance) and higher counterparty risk 
(higher density). Again, it is rather counterintuitive to find that unsecured market’s density 
and average distance are higher and lower than those corresponding to secured market’s, 
respectively. Nevertheless, once again, the small club properties of the unsecured market 
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may explain such result: participants’ dissimilar degree of heterogeneity in secured and 
unsecured markets determines cross-differences in the way they connect among them. 
Examining central bank’s repo market tradeoff demands caution. It is evident that its 
combinations yield an intermediate level of liquidity risk, between the unsecured and 
secured markets. However, as already stated, the actual average distance should be 
 ̂       , which corresponds to the fact that all participating financial institutions are one 
edge away from central bank’s money –the only source of liquidity. Central bank’s repo 
networks counterparty risk is the highest and most disperse. This may be interpreted as the 
central bank being able to accommodate very different network sizes (i.e. number of 
institutions) and potential costs and losses from non-refunding counterparties without 
sacrificing its ability to exchange liquidity with the market. Yet, as stated before, the 
reduced number of participants on certain dates causes the unusual high density in central 
bank’s repo networks (see Figure 3a and Figure 3b in Appendix). After acknowledging the 
natural limitations of standard network analysis to capture the role of the central bank in the 
repo network, it is reasonable to affirm that observed network structure and tradeoff 
conveniently matches central bank’s main functions by granting direct access to liquidity 
without creating excessive exposures between financial institutions –as its star structure 
allows. 
About the entire money market network, most of its combinations of liquidity and 
counterparty risk overlap with those of the secured market. This is somewhat unexpected 
because the networks are not weighted, thus the contribution of the secured market is 
merely structural, and it is not driven by the weight (i.e. value) of its transactions. The 
combination of liquidity risk and counterparty risk in the entire money market network 
shows that liquidity risk is higher than that corresponding to the central bank’s repo and the 
unsecured market, and rather similar to that of the secured market. Regarding counterparty 
risk, consistent with Table 2, the entire money market is particularly sparse. Hence, it is 
reasonable to affirm that the entire money market network attains a low level of 
counterparty risk (i.e. low density) and a liquidity risk level close to that attained by the 
secured market. As both the entire money market network and the secured market network 
comprise a heterogeneous mix of different types of financial institutions (e.g. banking and 
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non-banking, large and small), they share a common liquidity and counterparty risks 
tradeoff, whereas the central bank’s repo and the unsecured markets stand because of their 
particular traits.  
Finally, it is interesting to assess the extent to which density explains average distance 
among financial institutions. To this aim we run a standard linear regression model 
(ordinary least squares). We expect this linear relation to be inverse (i.e. a tradeoff), with 
levels varying according to each market’s features. Table 3 reports the estimated results. 
Central bank’s repo network is excluded from Table 3 as changes in star-shaped networks’ 
density result in unequivocal and predictable changes in the average distance between 
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Adjusted     0.15 0.01 0.16 
Table 3. Ordinary least squares results. t-statistics are reported in brackets, with statistical 
significance at 5% (**) and 1% (***). Central bank’s repo network is not reported as changes in 
star-shaped networks’ density result in unequivocal and predictable changes in the average distance 
between participants, thus regression is “perfect” and no errors are available for report or for 
calculating statistical significance. Estimated coefficients and goodness-of-fit statistics suggest that 
network’s density ( ) explains the average distance among participating financial institutions ( ), 
but the explanatory power diverges across markets. 
 
The coefficient corresponding to the secured market displays a significant inverse linear 
relation (        ), which reflects that as the network accommodates more linkages (it 
becomes more dense) the average distance among financial institutions decreases. This 
means that reductions in financial institutions’ counterparty risk aversion (i.e. higher 
density) should enhance their ability to exchange liquidity (i.e. lower average distance). 
The goodness-of-fit for the secured market suggests that the model is explanatory to some 
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extent. Non-linear relations between density and average distance, presumably arising from 
the way connections are distributed among participants (e.g. clustering, reciprocity), may 
limit the explanatory power of the model.
16
  
The coefficient corresponding to the unsecured market displays a negative linear 
relationship with average distance as well, but the level of the coefficient (        ) and 
its significance is lower than that of secured markets. Moreover, the goodness-of-fit for the 
unsecured markets is rather low, which may be interpreted as other non-considered 
variables being important for the model. Therefore, the model suggests that increasing the 
number of connections among financial institutions in the unsecured market does not 
reduce their average distance as much as in the case of the secured market. As they are 
quite close already due to their homogeneous features, increasing their interconnections 
does not affect their ability to find counterparties to exchange liquidity with. 
Consistent with the structural resemblance between the secured market and the entire 
money market, the coefficient for the latter is also significant and its effect is of a similar 
magnitude (          ). Therefore, the inverse relation between density and average 
distance is also apparent after aggregating the three money markets: Variations in the 
number of connections do affect financial institutions’ ability to trade liquidity among them 
as expected. Not only this matches our expectations, but also overlaps with what was 
observed during the global financial crisis of 2007-08, when reluctance to engage in 
exposures (i.e. lower density) resulted in lower access to liquidity (i.e. higher distance), and 
the subsequent central bank’s intervention to restore access to liquidity (i.e. reducing 
distance). 
 
5 Final remarks  
By examining the connective structure of distinct Colombian money market networks we 
study how financial institutions interact to resolve the tradeoff between liquidity risk and 
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 Market volatility, market liquidity, and central bank’s monetary stance –among many others- may be 
variables to consider in a comprehensive examination of the relation between density and average distance –
which is not intended in this paper. 
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counterparty risk. We undertake this examination by means of measuring money market 
networks’ centralization, and by exploring how centralization is related to attaining two 
conflicting objectives in network optimization, namely minimizing financial institutions’ 
connections and mutual distances. Based on recent literature on financial networks we 
assume that these two conflicting objectives correspond to the tradeoff between 
counterparty risk and liquidity risk, respectively. 
To the best of our knowledge this approach to examining the connective structure of 
financial networks is novel. Therefore, our work provides empirical evidence on how 
liquidity exchanges between financial institutions occur in different types of money 
markets, and on how the corresponding distinct liquidity risk and counterparty risk 
tradeoffs are attained. 
Empirical evidence suggests that different types of money market networks diverge in their 
centralization in an intuitive manner: Central bank’s repo network is a fully centralized star 
network, whereas secured and unsecured liquidity exchanges exhibit features consistent 
with a sparse connective structure that lays somewhere between the star and the complete 
network. About how each market balances counterparty risk and liquidity risk, evidence 
suggests that liquidity exchanges between financial institutions in the unsecured market 
displays features consistent with cross-underinsurance, which mainly come in the form of a 
discriminatory access that favors banking institutions. By pledging collateral the secured 
market allows a broader spectrum of different types of financial institutions to access 
liquidity, thus reducing cross-underinsurance; this may be related to collateral’s role in 
mitigating problems related to asymmetric information (see Berger et al. (2011)). However, 
against the intuition that pledging collaterals would yield a dense and well-connected 
network in which financial institutions could exchange liquidity as in an anonymous 
trading exchange (see Babus (2012) and Afonso, et al. (2013)), the secured network is 
sparse and with average distances typical of core-periphery connective structures. In this 
sense, the secured market also displays features consistent with cross-underinsurance, but 
in the form of a network with distant counterparties. As expected, central bank’s star 
network achieves the full coverage of liquidity risk with the minimum expected losses, thus 
27 
 
it is the less inefficient in guaranteeing the coverage of liquidity risk (see Castiglionesi and 
Eboli (2015)). 
Implications of our results come in several forms. Our results point out that the connective 
structure of central bank’s repo network may be particularly helpful in alleviating tensions 
in the money market. Thus, we provide evidence favoring the unconventional policy 
measures adopted by central banks during the global financial crisis. From our viewpoint, 
consistent with Acharya et al. (2012) and Temizsoy et al. (2015), central bank’s role in 
most developed countries during the global financial crisis may be portrayed as an attempt 
to reduce the distance between financial institutions, which had increased amid their 
reluctance to sustain money markets’ connectedness because of a surge in uncertainty about 
counterparty risk. 
Our results also suggest that pledging collateral may reduce cross-liquidity underinsurance 
by allowing heterogeneous financial institutions to access liquidity from their peers. 
However, concurrent with other empirical works (see King (2008), Gorton and Metrick 
(2012), and Martínez and León (2015)), pledging collateral does not offset counterparty 
risk completely, and does not result in a decentralized network.  
Some caveats about our work are worth stating. First, we assume that counterparty risk and 
liquidity risk may be captured by network’s density and average distance. Despite we find 
this is a fair assumption to make based on related literature, we acknowledge that other 
institution-centric factors (e.g. robustness, business lines, funding needs, risk profiles, cash 
flows, location) and system-wide conditions (e.g. market illiquidity, risk aversion, 
monetary policy stance) may determine the network’s connective structure. Examining how 
those factors may determine the formation of networks is beyond our scope, but it is an 
interesting research path. Second, a key pending issue in our analysis is related to the recent 
introduction of mandatory central clearing and settlement for most secured transactions in 
the Colombian case, namely sell/buy backs with local sovereign securities as collateral.
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As with other star networks (e.g. central bank’s repo network), it is expected that 
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 Staring October 7 2015 it is mandatory that a central counterparty clears and settles all sell/buy backs 
traded in the electronic trading platform owned and operated by the Central Bank (i.e. SEN). The electronic 
trading platform owned and operated by the Colombian Stock Exchange (i.e. MEC) adopted central clearing 
of sell/buy backs on January 18 2016. 
28 
 
centralized clearing and settlement by the sole local central counterparty may contribute to 
mitigating liquidity risk and counterparty risk. Examining whether (or not) centralized 
clearing and settlement changes the connective structure of financial institutions’ liquidity 
exchanges in the secured money market is a particularly interesting topic under our 
approach. Third, estimating the explanatory power of density and average distance as 
determinants of money market interest rates is worthwhile. They are system-wide measures 
of market dynamics that may supplement traditional institution-centric determinants (e.g. 
leverage, solvency, profitability).  Finally, as usual with other real-world networks, it is 
important to highlight that the non-large and disparate number of participants across the 
networks may complicate their examination by means of basic network statistics, thus 
conclusions are to be drawn with care.  
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Figure 4. Counterparty risk (x-axis) and liquidity risk (y-axis) tradeoff. Each 
marker corresponds to the combination between density and average distance 
calculated on observed daily networks for the four markets. Unlike Figure 2, 
average distance is calculated for all vertexes (i.e. reachable and non-reachable) by 
imposing an arbitrary distance of     between two non-reachable vertexes. 
Consequently average distances increased manifestly in all networks (except that 
corresponding to central bank’s repos).  
 
 
 
